Atlanta Employment Lawyer Blog

It has been a good Supreme Court term for employees. In a recent post, we wrote about the Supreme Court’s decision in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, in which the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Section 1981) encompasses retaliation claims even though the text of the statute contains no reference to retaliation. In today’s post, we discuss another retaliation decision by the Supreme Court, Gomez-Perez v. Potter, in which the Court held that under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a federal employee who is a victim of retaliation in response to the filing of a complaint of age discrimination may assert a retaliation claim under the federal-sector provision of the ADEA.

In the case, Myrna Gomez-Perez was employed by the United States Postal Service (USPS) and was 45 years old at the time when she requested a job transfer. When her supervisor rejected her request for a transfer she filed an internal age discrimination complaint, alleging that the denial of her transfer request was based on her age and therefore discriminatory. Ms. Gomez-Perez claimed that in response to her complaint, she was retaliated against by the USPS in various ways, including groundless complaints about her work and a significant reduction in her work hours.

Continue reading "Supreme Court Wrap-Up II: Court Finds Implied Claim of Retaliation in Age Discrimination Act" »

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Posted In: Retaliation

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The United States Supreme Court has recently issued a number of very employee-friendly employment discrimination decisions. In this post and our next few posts, we will discuss these important employment discrimination decisions.

In the first case, CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the Court addressed the issue of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Section 1981) permits actions for retaliatory discharge. Section 1981 is a Civil War-era federal civil rights law that gives “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Plaintiffs often choose to file race discrimination claims under Section 1981 in addition to Title VII claims because there is no requirement to first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, Section 1981’s statue of limitations is much longer than Title VII’s 180-day limitations period, and Section 1981 has no cap on damages. However, unlike Title VII, Section 1981 does not contain language prohibiting retaliation, and many courts have therefore held that retaliation claims are not available under the statute.

In the case, Hedrick Humphries was an African-American manager of a Cracker Barrel restaurant who claimed he was discharged because of his race and because he had complained that another African-American employee had been discriminated against because of his race. Accordingly, he brought suit under both Title VII and Section 1981. The lower court dismissed Humphries’ Title VII claim on procedural grounds and granted Cracker Barrel’s motion for summary judgment on Humphries’ Section 1981 claim, holding that retaliation claims are not available under the statute.

Continue reading "Supreme Court Wrap-Up: Supremes Rule that Section 1981 Encompasses Claims for Retaliation" »

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Posted In: Race Discrimination , Retaliation

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We just received a good result from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the federal appeals court for the states of Georgia, Florida and Alabama) in a race discrimination and retaliation case and, at the risk of seeming immodest, we’d like to share it with you. It’s a very employee-friendly decision on the issue of what is an adverse action under the discrimination laws, and the court held that when a company makes a discriminatory decision that it later corrects, the employer’s after-the-fact corrective action does not cure the initially discriminatory act.

In the case, Crawford v. Carroll, our client, Jacquelyn Crawford, is an African American female who was employed at Georgia State University in various capacities in its human resources department. Her dispute with GSU began with a disciplinary action she received for allegedly violating the school’s bereavement leave policy. When she complained about this discipline, she claimed she was subjected to retaliation by her Caucasian supervisor in the form of unreasonable job demands and overly critical scrutiny of her work.

The dispute then escalated when Crawford was denied a promotion to a position that was posted several times during a two-year period even though several managers believed she was the most qualified applicant for the position. During this period, Crawford’s Caucasian supervisors issued her a negative performance review, which made her ineligible for a merit pay increase that she was scheduled to receive in October 2002. In response, Crawford filed an internal complaint contending that the poor performance review and resulting disqualification for the merit pay increase were racially discriminatory and retaliatory.

While her internal complaint was pending, the position that Crawford had been denied was posted for a third time. This time, Crawford was not even selected for an interview, and GSU recommended that a Caucasian male be awarded the position.

Continue reading "Discriminatory Denial of Pay Raise Cannot be Cured by Later Raise" »

Posted by Buckley & Klein | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: Race Discrimination , Retaliation

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