June 15, 2010

Jury Finds Medical Center Discriminated Against Muslim Doctor

In May a federal jury awarded a Muslim Egyptian-born man over $3.6 million, as the result of severe religious and race discrimination that forced him to resign from his job at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center.

In the post-9/11 climate, anti-immigrant sentiment has increased, often taking the form of religious, national origin, or race discrimination. Title VII specifically protects these classes and prohibits your employer from taking adverse action against you because of your race or color, ethnic background, or religious beliefs. If you complain of these types of discrimination or harassment, companies are prohibited from retaliating against you. Often these types of discrimination are intertwined.

In Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., a jury found that the hospital “constructively discharged" Nassar because of his race, national origin and religious preference. The jury also held that the hospital had retaliated against him in violation of Title VII. Specific discriminatory actions included derogatory comments, and failures/delays in promotion. After Nassar was offered a new job, the hospital contacted the new employer and informed it about Nassar’s EEOC complaint, and recommended Nassar not be hired. Based on the UTSW’s actions, Nassar’s employment offer was rescinded.

Unfortunately, in recent years anti-immigrant discrimination in the work place has proliferated. Often discriminatory actions manifest themselves subtly – such as English only rules and dress codes. Discrimination may also occur in how you are allowed to practice your religion.

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May 31, 2010

Supreme Court Finds Black Firefighters’ Race Discrimination Claim Timely

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that black firefighters did not miss the deadline to file a cause of action for race discrimination against the City of Chicago, holding that reliance on a discriminatory test administered in the past can constitute a new violation of Title VII.

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race. Race discrimination often occurs through facially “neutral” practices that have the effect of screening out minority applicants and employees, such as employment tests, appearance and dress codes, English-only rules.

At issue in Lewis v. City of Chicago was a written employment test administered to more than 26,000 firefighter applicants. The City of Chicago stated that everyone who scored above a 65 on the test was qualified, but would only hire those who were “well qualified” – i.e. those individuals who scored an 89 or better.

The firefighters brought a lawsuit under Title VII for race discrimination based on a disparate impact theory, i.e. that they were denied jobs as the result of a flawed employment test. In order to fall within the 300-day deadline to file a claim, the firefighters asserted that each time the fire department relied on the test to make a hiring decision a separate act of discrimination occurred, and hence constituted a “continuing violation.”

The trial court agreed and held that the score of 89 was statistically meaningless and had a “severe disparate impact against African-Americans.” The appeals court reversed.

On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that each use of a forbidden employment practice gave rise to a separate claim of discrimination. He distinguished between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims, noting that for disparate impact claims deliberate discrimination need not be shown within the limitations period. Although Scalia acknowledged this decision might allow suits for long-established practices, ruling otherwise would allow employers to use “an unlawful practice with impunity.”

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May 9, 2010

Supreme Court Evaluates Who Should Decide Validity of Arbitration Agreements

Many times as a condition of employment a new hire will sign an employment agreement containing a mandatory arbitration agreement. Often, these arbitration agreements provide that an arbitrator has the exclusive authority to resolve certain employment disagreements.

Although arbitration may have many advantages, such as being quicker and less expensive than traditional litigation, the mandatory arbitration clauses often found in employment agreements or employee handbooks can be unfair and contain unfavorable provisions.

In Rent-A-Center West Inc. v. Jackson, U.S., No. 09-587, oral argument 4/26/10), an African American account manager – Antonio Jackson - challenged who should determine if the mandatory arbitration clause he signed as a condition of employment was unconscionable and unenforceable – an arbitrator or the federal court.

The arbitration issue arose out of Jackson’s race discrimination case against Rent-a-Center, for the alleged failure of Rent-A-Center to promote him and its promoting of non-African American employees with less seniority. After complaining to his superiors, the Jackson was transferred and eventually fired.

The company then filed a motion to compel arbitration in order to resolve Jackson’s discrimination claims. Jackson objected, asserting that the arbitration agreement was “unconscionable and unenforceable” in part because it limited discovery and that he was told it was non-negotiable when he was hired by Rent-A-Center.

A decision is expected in June, however much of the questioning focused on whether the issues raised in this case deal with the formation – or “making of the agreement” – in which case the Court must decide if the agreement is valid or "post-formation” issues which the arbitrator would decide.

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June 23, 2008

Supreme Court Wrap-Up: Supremes Rule that Section 1981 Encompasses Claims for Retaliation

The United States Supreme Court has recently issued a number of very employee-friendly employment discrimination decisions. In this post and our next few posts, we will discuss these important employment discrimination decisions.

In the first case, CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the Court addressed the issue of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Section 1981) permits actions for retaliatory discharge. Section 1981 is a Civil War-era federal civil rights law that gives “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Plaintiffs often choose to file race discrimination claims under Section 1981 in addition to Title VII claims because there is no requirement to first file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, Section 1981’s statue of limitations is much longer than Title VII’s 180-day limitations period, and Section 1981 has no cap on damages. However, unlike Title VII, Section 1981 does not contain language prohibiting retaliation, and many courts have therefore held that retaliation claims are not available under the statute.

In the case, Hedrick Humphries was an African-American manager of a Cracker Barrel restaurant who claimed he was discharged because of his race and because he had complained that another African-American employee had been discriminated against because of his race. Accordingly, he brought suit under both Title VII and Section 1981. The lower court dismissed Humphries’ Title VII claim on procedural grounds and granted Cracker Barrel’s motion for summary judgment on Humphries’ Section 1981 claim, holding that retaliation claims are not available under the statute.

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June 4, 2008

Discriminatory Denial of Pay Raise Cannot be Cured by Later Raise

We just received a good result from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the federal appeals court for the states of Georgia, Florida and Alabama) in a race discrimination and retaliation case and, at the risk of seeming immodest, we’d like to share it with you. It’s a very employee-friendly decision on the issue of what is an adverse action under the discrimination laws, and the court held that when a company makes a discriminatory decision that it later corrects, the employer’s after-the-fact corrective action does not cure the initially discriminatory act.

In the case, Crawford v. Carroll, our client, Jacquelyn Crawford, is an African American female who was employed at Georgia State University in various capacities in its human resources department. Her dispute with GSU began with a disciplinary action she received for allegedly violating the school’s bereavement leave policy. When she complained about this discipline, she claimed she was subjected to retaliation by her Caucasian supervisor in the form of unreasonable job demands and overly critical scrutiny of her work.

The dispute then escalated when Crawford was denied a promotion to a position that was posted several times during a two-year period even though several managers believed she was the most qualified applicant for the position. During this period, Crawford’s Caucasian supervisors issued her a negative performance review, which made her ineligible for a merit pay increase that she was scheduled to receive in October 2002. In response, Crawford filed an internal complaint contending that the poor performance review and resulting disqualification for the merit pay increase were racially discriminatory and retaliatory.

While her internal complaint was pending, the position that Crawford had been denied was posted for a third time. This time, Crawford was not even selected for an interview, and GSU recommended that a Caucasian male be awarded the position.

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April 10, 2008

Court Affirms Half Million Dollar Verdict in Race Discrimination Case

“Despite considerable racial progress, racism persists as an evil to be remedied in our Nation.” These words, penned by Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge William H. Pryor, are from an important race discrimination case recently decided by the federal appeals court for Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, in which the court affirmed a verdict of more than half a million dollars to an African-American employee who was fired after he refused to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co.

Greg Goldsmith was exposed to a stream of severe racist comments and conduct during his employment, and, although he complained about it repeatedly, his employer failed to correct the problem. He filed a charge of race discrimination with the EEOC. While his charge was pending, the company adopted a mandatory arbitration policy that required all employees to arbitrate all discrimination claims, and it presented the policy to all of its employees to sign. Mr. Goldsmith, however, was the only employee who had a pending discrimination charge against the company. When Mr. Goldsmith refused to sign the arbitration agreement, he was immediately discharged, but other employees who had initially refused to sign the agreement were not discharged.

In Mr. Goldsmith’s subsequent race discrimination case, he argued that his discharge was in retaliation for his refusal to sign the arbitration policy. The jury agreed, awarding him $50,000 in back pay and emotional distress damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.

On the employer’s appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict, holding that because Goldsmith had agreed to sign the arbitration policy had the company agreed to exclude his pending charge from the policy, and because the company had tried to convince white employees who initially refused to sign the agreement to change their mind, but it simply discharged Goldsmith, there was sufficient evidence of retaliatory animus by the employer to support the verdict.