Atlanta Employment Lawyer Blog

A New York federal court has determined that the Department of Justice may proceed with a religious discrimination case against the New York City Transit Authority brought on behalf of New York City bus drivers, train operators and subway station agents who were denied accommodation or subjected to selective enforcement of job-related headwear policies.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on your religious beliefs. Pursuant to Title VII, three separate protections exists:

• Your employer must make reasonable efforts to accommodate your religious beliefs and practices;
• Your employer may not impose its religious views on you or permit your co-employees to impose their religious views on you; and
• Your employer may not take adverse action against you (including harassment) because of your religious beliefs.

In United States v. New York City Transit Auth., the alleged discriminatory practices occurred Post-9/11, with the NYCTA enforcing headwear policies selectively against Muslim bus operators although they had previously worn khimars while providing passenger services. Subway train operators and station agents went through similar experiences regarding the headwear policies for their positions.

Although the NYCTA amended the headwear policies allowing for turban and khimars to be made out of NYCTA blue cotton fabric, they required an agency logo be place in the middle of their religious headwear, rather than allowing the logo to be placed on the collar or pocket.

In rejecting the NYCTA’s assertion of hardship, the court noted that any hardship was “nowhere near as obvious as the hardships posted by exempting the employees of certain commercial businesses from grooming requirements.” Additionally, wearing the logo wasn’t necessitated by a concern for safety.

Continue reading " Religious Discrimination Lawsuit Progresses " »

A recent case determined that an employer’s varying rationale for terminating a manager showed “pretext” sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.

In Eades v. Brookdale Senior Living Inc., a 42 –year-old man, David Eades - was fired from his job at a senior living center. Eades subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and retaliation. A federal trial court granted summary judgment against him, and he appealed the claim of retaliation.

Title VII and other discrimination laws prohibit retaliation in the workplace. If you experience retaliation in the workplace, you are entitled to the same remedies as you have in an analogous discrimination case. It is important to note though, retaliation does not mean any type of retaliatory conduct by your employer. Retaliation means you complained about discriminatory conduct in the workplace and you were retaliated against as a result.

Here, the company presented a variety of reasons for terminating Eades including that Eades stated he could no longer work at the company and requested a severance package, that he was fired for performance problems, that he kept a severance package from a former employer, and that he rejected the severance package he was offered.

Although the company’s explanation may or may not lead to an ultimate conclusion that it retaliated against Eades, as noted by Judge John R. Gibson, “Shifting justifications over time call the credibility of those justifications into question.” As a result, the alternating excuses behind Eades termination created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment.”

The bottom line – making up various excuses for adverse employment actions may be a red flag that your employer has acted inappropriately and violated anti-discrimination and retaliation laws.

Continue reading " Inconsistent Reasons For Firing Constitute Pretext " »

The House Financial Services Institution and Consumer Credit Subcommittee recently heard testimony regarding the use of credit checks and whether their use is discriminatory. At issue – whether H.R. 3149 placing more restrictions on the use of credit checks is necessary to restrain discrimination in light of current laws.

Proponents argue that restricting the use of credit checks is needed to eliminate “unfair hiring practices” and would open up more jobs for those Americans who are qualified for jobs, but have bad credit. The Equal Employment for All Act would prohibit the use of consumer credit checks against prospective and current employees for the purpose of making adverse employment decisions, including hiring, promotions, transfers, and terminations.

Many cite the use of credit checks as disproportionately affecting minorities and that making employment decisions based a credit scores creates a discriminatory bias on the basis of race and national origin. Race discrimination often occurs through subtle practices that tend to screen out minority applicants and employees. Proponents of H.R. 3149 assert that using credit checks does just that, ultimately harming those of color.

Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez concludes, “[c]redit reports are simply inappropriate for use in most hiring decisions.”

Continue reading " Is It Discriminatory To Use Credit Checks In Employment Decisions? " »

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has determined that the mayor of Indianapolis and other city officials can be held liable to three white police lieutenants whose constitutional rights to equal protection were violated when they were denied promotions. Black officers who ranked lower on the eligibility list were promoted instead – giving rise to the white officers claims of “reverse discrimination.” The officer’s Title VII claims are still pending.

The city officials claimed qualified immunity based on a 1978 consent decree between the Justice Department and Indianapolis requiring them to take race into account when making promotions. While the consent decree set goals for increasing the percentage of African American police officers in all ranks, the 7th Circuit held that the federal court was correct in finding that it did not “mandate the promotions at issue.”

The 7th Circuit also determined that the federal court correctly denied immunity to the officials. Even though the consent decree set recruitment and hiring goals for black officers, promotions were to be based on relevant standards and criteria, applied without regard to race or color.

The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the city’s provision for race-neutral promotional exams would be undermined if race could be used as a criterion for promotions. As such, the white officers claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 were allowed to proceed.

Title VII and other race discrimination laws protect against discrimination based on the color of your skin, even where you are not a racial minority. Both discrimination and “reverse discrimination” cases may arise when an employer takes an adverse employment action against an employee based on race such as a termination, failure to hire, or failure to promote.

Continue reading " Consent Decree Cannot Shield Officials From Reverse Race Bias Claim " »